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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMPLIANCE,  
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND ENTERPRISE 
RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE TRUMP/PENCE 
ERA 
Marcia Narine Weldon* 
[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception and 
fraud. - Milton Friedman, 19701 
INTRODUCTION 
With Republicans controlling Congress, a Republican CEO as 
President, a “czar” appointed to oversee deregulation,2 and billionaires 
leading key Cabinet posts, corporate America had reason for optimism 
following President Trump’s unexpected election in 2016. However, the 
first year of the Trump Administration has not yielded the kinds of re-
sults that many business people had originally anticipated. Candidate 
Trump promised an aggressive agenda of, among other things, disman-
                                                        
*Lecturer in law at the University of Miami, former Deputy General Counsel, Vice 
President of Global Conduct and Business Standards, and Chief Privacy Officer of a 
Fortune 500 Company. I would like to thank Jaymar Bonet, Janna Mateo, Daniel Jo-
seph, Amal Uthman, and the organizers and participants of the Business Law: Connect-
ing the Threads Symposium at the University of Tennessee College of Law.  
1 Milton Friedman, A Friedman doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 126. 
2 Carl Icahn, the President’s advisor on deregulation, stepped down from his appoint-
ment in August 2017. See Tom DiChristopher & Everett Rosenfield, Carl Ichan Resigned 
from Trump Advisor Role Ahead of Article Alleging Conflict of Interest, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2017), 
www.cnbc.com/2017/08/20/carl-icahn-resigned-from-trump-advisor-role-ahead-of-
article-alleging-conflict-of-interest.html; see also Joe Mont, Ichan Bids Adieu as Trump’s 
Unofficial Deregulation Guru, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.com-
plianceweek.com/blogs/the-filing-cabinet/icahn-bids-adieu-as-trump%E2%80%99s-
unofficial-deregulation-guru#.WbB-CJOGPFQ. 
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tling Dodd-Frank,3 repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act, 4 
improving the nation’s infrastructure, revamping trade deals, solving the 
decades-old immigration dilemma, eliminating onerous laws, and lower-
ing the tax burden.5  
Unfortunately, not only has this pro-business agenda stalled in 
Congress, but the President has, in some instances, issued executive or-
ders 6 and proposed legislation 7 that completely contravenes much of                                                         
3 See Emily Flitter & Steve Holland, Trump Preparing Plan to Dismantle Obama’s Wall Street 
Reform Law, REUTERS (May 17, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-election-trump-banks/trump-preparing-plan-to-dismantle-obamas-wall-street-
reform-law-idUSKCN0Y900J; see generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,111th Cong. (2010).  
4 See Caroline Humer, Trump Promised to Repeal Obamacare. Now What?, REUTERS (Nov. 
10, 2016, 6:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-obamacare-analy-
sis/trump-promised-to-repeal-obamacare-now-what-idUSKBN135171; see generally H.R. 
DOC. NO. 111-1, 111th Cong. (2010).  
5 See Pamela Engel, Trump’s First 100 Days Were Unlike Any We’ve Ever Seen – Here Are 
All the Promises He’s Kept and Broken, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2017), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/ trump-first-100-days-promises-2017-4. 
6 See David Streitfeld et al., Silicon Valley's Ambivalence Toward Trump Turns to Anger, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/technology/silicon-
valleys-ambivalence-toward-trump-turns-to-anger.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (observing 
reactions to an executive order temporarily barring immigrants from predominantly 
Muslim countries). After repeated failures of the Republican-led Congress to repeal and 
replace the Affordable Care Act, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Octo-
ber 12, 2017 asking federal agencies to determine ways to expand the use of association 
health plans and to broaden the definition of short-term insurance, which is currently 
exempt from the Affordable Care Act. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, PRESIDENTIAL 
EXECUTIVE ORDER PROMOTING HEALTHCARE CHOICE AND COMPETITION ACROSS 
THE UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/ 
12/presidential-executive-order-promoting-healthcare-choice-and-competition. Many in 
the business community voiced concerns about the stability of the insurance market 
after this Order and the President’s statements that he may end health care subsidies.  
See also Dan Mangan, Obamacare Defenders Blast Trump's New Executive Order on Health Care 
as More 'Sabotage', CNBC (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/12 
/obamacare-defenders-blast-trumps-new-executive-order-on-health-care-as-more-sabo-
tage.html (the American Academy of Actuaries observed, the order "could present sig-
nificant risks and have unintended consequences for consumers and health insurance 
markets."). The Administration’s new tax plan, which eliminates the individual mandate, 
has also raised concerns. Robert Pear, Without the Insurance Mandate, Health Care’s Future  
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what his former business peers have advocated for over the years. In ad-
dition, dozens of CEOs have resigned from various presidential advisory 
boards that would have provided the executives with the opportunity for 
significant influence over policies that could positively affect their share-
holders, employees, and customers.8 These resignations may raise corpo-
rate governance concerns because, in some cases, they had nothing to do 
with purely commercial interests but more to do with public perception, 
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”),9 or the CEO’s stated personal 
ideologies.                                                                                                                                    
May be in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18 
/us/politics/tax-cut-obamacare-individual-mandate-repeal.html?_r=0 
7 See Catherine Rampell, Our Business President Looks Pretty Anti-Business, WASHINGTON 
POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/our-businessman-
president-looks-pretty-anti-business/2017/04/10/7452639c-1e28-11e7-be2a3a1fb24 
d4671_story.html?utm_term=.4122a1078081. 
8  See Jessica Estepa, Hispanic Chamber CEO Resigns from Trump’s Diversity Council over 
DACA Decision, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/politics/onpolitics/2017/09/05/hispanic-chamber-commerce-ceo-resigns-diver-
sity-council-over-daca-decision/633219001/; Jena McGregor & Damian Paletta, 
Trump’s Business Advisory Council Disband as CEOs Abandon President Over Charlottesville, 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-
leadership/wp/2017/08/16/after-wave-of-ceo-departures-trump-ends-business-and-
manufacturing-councils/?utm_term=.39ae797910fe. 
9 There is no one established definition for CSR. See, e.g., Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, 
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness, 59 
MGMT. SCI. 1045, [1046] ([May] 2013), http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/ms2013.pdf 
(citing various definitions but adopting the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development’s 2004 definition) . . . . The United States government has explained, 
“[r]esponsible business conduct is intended to include a broad range of areas in which 
corporate conduct impacts society. It is well understood that responsible business con-
duct (RBC), sometimes referred to as corporate social responsibility or CSR, entails 
conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognised standards. Based 
on the idea that you can do well while doing no harm, RBC is a broad concept that 
focuses on two aspects of the business-society relationship: 1) the positive contribution 
businesses can make to economic, environmental, and social progress with a view to 
achieving sustainable development, and 2) avoiding adverse impacts and addressing 
them when they do occur.” [U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, USG NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, Feb. 12, 2015,] https://www.state.gov/documents/ organiza-
tion/265918.pdf/; see also Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate  
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Business people thrive on predictability as they manage their en-
terprise risks, but the Trump Administration has been anything but pre-
dictable, and as of the time of this writing, shows no signs of settling 
down. This Essay will thus outline how general counsel, boards, compli-
ance officers, and institutional investors should think about risk during 
an increasingly volatile administration. Specifically, I will discuss key cor-
porate governance, compliance, and social responsibility issues facing 
U.S. public companies, although some of the remarks will also apply to 
the smaller companies that serve as their vendors, suppliers, and custom-
ers. Tennessee, which has more citizens working for foreign employers 
than any other U.S. state,10 several corporate headquarters, and a bur-
geoning startup community, serves as a microcosm of U.S. economy.  
In Part I, I will discuss the importance of enterprise risk man-
agement (“ERM”) in general and some of the prevailing standards that 
govern it. In Part II, I will focus on the changing role of counsel and 
compliance officers as risk managers and will discuss recent surveys on 
the key risk factors that companies face under any political administra-
tion, but particularly under President Trump. Part III will outline some 
of the substantive issues related to compliance, specifically the enforce-
ment priorities of various regulatory agencies. Part IV will discuss an is-
sue that may pose a dilemma for companies under Trump—
environmental issues, and specifically shareholder proposals and climate 
change disclosures in light of the conflict between the current EPA’s po-
sition regarding climate change, the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Cli-
mate Accord, and corporate commitments to sustainability. Part V will 
conclude by posing questions and proposing recommendations using the 
ERM framework and adopting a stakeholder rather than a shareholder                                                                                                                                   
Irresponsibility for Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 84, n.25 
(2015); see also Ulrike Zeigerman, Responsible Business Conduct: From Good Intentions to Sus-
tainable Development, 3 COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 2 (May 2014), 
https://www.oecd.org/pcd/Coherence%20for%20Development_April_2014.pdf (de-
fining CSR as entailing “conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally 
recognised standards.”). 
10 Patricia Cohen, When Foreign Companies Are Making, Not Killing, U.S. Jobs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/business/economy/chattanoo-
ga-foreign-investment.html?mcubz=1. 
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maximization perspective. 11 I submit that companies that choose to pull 
back on CSR or sustainability programs in response to the President’s 
purported pro-business agenda will actually hurt both shareholders and 
stakeholders.  
I.  THE CHANGING FACE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
Corporate counsel have a number of sources for risk-
management related guidance including Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, 
fiduciary duties under Delaware law, and the New York Stock Exchange 
Listing Standards. I will discuss each of these briefly below.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has required 
companies to publicly disclose all material risks since the mid-1990s;12 
however despite these disclosures, massive corporate scandals have 
wiped out shareholder value and led to repeated recessions. Congress 
passed Sarbanes-Oxley13 in 2002 after the public lost trust in financial                                                         
11 A detailed shareholder versus stakeholder maximization debate is beyond the scope 
of this paper. For excellent articles on the subject see generally William W. Bratton & 
Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern 
Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008) (“A continuing and longstanding debate has 
been waged in corporate law scholarship among those who favor shareholder primacy, 
those who favor management discretion, and those who believe that corporations have 
a social responsibility to other constituencies, such as the corporation’s employees, and 
the wider public interest.”); Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession 
Theory, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014) (providing a history of the debate, discuss-
ing director primacy, team production, shareholder primacy, managerialism, and con-
cession theories and arguing, “anyone favoring mandatory corporate social responsibil-
ity should also support concession theory because it is the theory that most empowers 
the state to mandate socially responsible behavior on the part of corporations.” Id. at 4). 
12 See Report of The Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory 
Processes, SEC (1996), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm. Risk factor 
disclosure on Forms 10-K and 10-Q have been in place since 2005. On October 11, 
2017, the SEC proposed amendments to modernize and streamline disclosures, includ-
ing risk factors. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules to Implement FAST Act 
Mandate to Modernize and Simplify Disclosure (Oct. 11, 2017) (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-192). Among other things, the SEC 
proposes allowing firms to focus on a principles-based approach of the risks tailored 
for its investors. 
13 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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institutions and corporate America, but notwithstanding the additional 
due diligence requirements and risk mitigation measures, the financial 
markets collapsed again in 2008 in part due to excessive risk taking. Fol-
lowing the 2008 financial crisis, the New York Stock Exchange Commis-
sion on Governance performed a thorough review of the legal landscape 
and outlined director duties as follows:  
In assessing shareholder concerns and 
demands, it is appropriate for directors to 
consider whether any constituencies (or 
their agents) have interests other than to 
maximize the long-term, sustainable prof-
itability of the corporation . . . . The board 
should also ensure that appropriate risk 
management systems are in place so that 
excessive risk taking is avoided.14   
Accordingly, companies listed on the NYSE must publicly disclose their 
guidelines and policies regarding their (1) risk assessments and risk man-
agement, (2) major financial risks, and (3) the steps taken to monitor and 
control the listed risks.15   
In response to the public clamor for reform and accountability 
after the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed Dodd-Frank16 in 2010. 
That law establishes additional protections for shareholders and inves-                                                        
14 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE), REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 26–27, (2010), http:// 
www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/nyse_cgreport_ 23sep2010_en.pdf. 
15 See Section 303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements, NYSE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 303A.07(c)(iii)(D) (approved Aug. 22, 2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com 
/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3_6&manual=%2Flcm%2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F. 
16 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act includes, among other things, corporate governance 
and executive compensation reforms, new rules for credit rating agencies, new registra-
tion requirements for hedge fund and private equity fund advisers, heightened regula-
tion of over-the-counter derivatives and asset-backed securities and significantly in-
creased oversight and regulation of banks and other financial institutions.  It also in-
cludes the conflict minerals provision discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
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tors. In 2010, the SEC also enacted new proxy disclosure requirements 
requiring companies to describe the board’s role in overseeing risk man-
agement, and the ways in which that oversight responsibility affects the 
board’s structure.17 The SEC also published interpretative guidance re-
garding companies’ obligations to disclose exposures and expenditures 
related to climate change risks.18  
 However, even before Dodd-Frank, boards had a clearly defined 
role in overseeing risk under the Caremark case, which establishes a 
board’s duty to ensure that that there is a credible and functioning com-
pliance program. In the 1996 Caremark litigation, a Delaware court estab-
lished that corporate directors may face personal liability for failing to 
adequately monitor employee-wrongdoers, and that in order to receive 
the protection of the business judgment rule, they must “exercise a good 
faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system is 
in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate in-
formation will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of 
ordinary operations so that it may satisfy its responsibility.”19  Although 
the board does not implement or manage the compliance program, the 
board must ensure that an effective, functioning compliance program 
exists. Counsel and compliance officers play a critical role in assisting the 
board in that task.  
Boards must also focus on sustainability as a key risk because 
both the United States and European Union (“EU”) governments20 seek                                                         
17 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(h) (2017). The SEC sought comments on Regulation S-K in 
2016 as part of a disclosure effectiveness project. See Request for Comment on Subpart 
400 of Regulation S-K Disclosure Requirements Relating to Management, Certain Secu-
rity Holders and Corporate Governance Matters, SEC, (2016), https://www.sec.gov 
/rules/other/2016/33-10198.pdf.  
18  Commission Guidance Regarding Climate Change, SEC (Feb.), https://www. 
sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf; 17 C.F.R § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2017); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.103 (2017). 
19 In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
20  See Council Directive 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095&from=EN (amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Infor-
mation by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups). 
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such non-financial disclosures. “Sustainability” is commonly defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”21 More 
firms than ever now also speak and report in terms of the “triple bottom 
line”—people, profit and planet22—because the market either encour-
ages or requires them to do so.23 Further, researchers have proven that 
“firms with good ratings on material sustainability issues significantly 
outperform firms with poor ratings on these issues.”24 
Indeed, in 2016, the EU implemented non-financial disclosures 
for any firm that conducts business in its borders, employs more than 
500 people, and has a balance sheet total of at least USD$25 million or a 
net turnover of approximately USD$50 million. 25 Starting in 2018, these 
companies must report annually on their policies related to: environmen-
tal protection; social responsibility and treatment of employees; respect                                                         
21 The definition likely comes from a seminal 1987 United Nations paper known as the 
Brundtland Report, which cautions that “sustainable development is not a fixed state of 
harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the 
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional 
change are made consistent with future as well as present needs.” See Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, Our Common Future, UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV. 
(WCED) ch. 2, introduction (1987), http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-
future.pdf. 
22 Triple Bottom Line: It Consists of Three Ps: Profit, People and Plant, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 
2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14301663. 
23 For examples, see Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Culture Sustainability on 
Organizational Processes and Performance, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17950, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/ w17950.pdf. The paper compares 90 
“high sustainability” companies that were early and voluntary adopters of environmen-
tal and social policies and which use these measures as governance practices, with 90 
“low sustainability companies” or traditional companies, finding that over an 18-year 
period, sustainable firms outperform traditional firms in terms of both stock market 
and accounting performance. 
24 Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 THE AC-
COUNTING REV. 1697, abstract, Nov. 9, 2016, https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2575912. 
25 See Katherine V. Smith, Sustainability Reports Getting Attention from Investors and Regula-
tors, BOS. C. CTR. FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:53:41 AM), 
http://corporatecitizenship.bc.edu/sustainability-reports. 
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for human rights; anti-corruption and bribery; and diversity on company 
boards (in terms of age, gender, educational and professional back-
ground).26 
Investors also increasingly seek information about sustainability 
thus forcing companies that do not have to comply with U.S. or EU 
governmental directives to report on environmental, social, and govern-
ance factors (“ESG”) anyway.27  A 2017 Ernst & Young survey of insti-
tutional investors revealed that 80% of respondents believe that compa-
nies have failed to develop adequate, long-term strategies on environ-
mental and social issues even though such strategies are critical to sus-
tainable growth and have quantifiable impact over the long term.28  
Companies are hearing from these large investors and respond-
ing. As John Liu, who managed New York City’s $152 billion pension 
fund for four years, has observed, “there are reports and studies that 
show that companies who pay attention to [ESG benchmarks] generally 
have a better track record of long-term growth.”29 Adding to the pres-
                                                        
26   Non-Financial Reporting, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/ busi-
ness-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/non-
financial-reporting_en (last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
27 Chris Park & Dinah A. Koehler, The Responsible Enterprise, in BUSINESS TRENDS 2013 
38, 39 (Deloitte Univ. Press 2013), https://www2.deloitte.com/content 
/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/Finance/CFO/2013-SO-Business-
Trends_vFINAL.pdf. The authors recommend that firms integrate ESG and financial 
reporting to build trust with customers, improve understanding of risk, and enable tar-
geted mitigation when things go wrong; also, observing that responsible enterprises 
attract funding and enjoy a lower cost of capital. Id. at 41–42. 
28  Is Your Nonfinancial Performance Revealing the True Value of Your Business to Investors?, 
ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LIMITED 3 (2017), http://www.ey.com/Publica-
tion/vwLUAssets/EY_-_Nonfinancial_performance_may_influence_investors/$FILE 
/ey-nonfinancial-performance-may-influence-investors.pdf. The survey gathered re-
sponses from 320 decision-makers for institutional investors around the world, a third 
of which have more than US$10b assets under management. Id. at 28. 
29  Dan Morrison, US Companies Rank Miserably Low on the UN’s New Corporate Responsibil-
ity Rankings, QUARTZ (Apr. 19, 2017), https://qz.com/963033/us-companies-rank-
miserably-low-on-the-uns-new-corporate-responsibility-rankings/. 
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sure, in 2016, the California Public Employees Retirement System30 be-
gan asking corporations it invests in to seat climate change experts on 
their boards.31 
The regulatory system also requires firms to consider the triple 
bottom line through the shareholder proposal process under Rule 14a-8, 
which allows certain shareholders to submit a proposal to be included in 
the company’s annual report for a shareholder vote in proxy statements 
at the annual meeting.32 Often these include ESG matters. In fact, of the 
827 proposals filed in 2017, 201 concerned social issues filed mostly by 
pension funds and socially responsible investors.33 As of the end of 2015, 
1 in 5 dollars, or 8.72 trillion dollars, was invested according to socially 
responsible investing principles.34 
Finally, influential proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”) bases its 2017 guidelines on the following governing 
principles: 
[S]ocially responsible investors have dual 
objectives: financial and social. Socially re-
sponsible investors invest for economic 
gain, as do all investors, but they also re-
quire that the companies in which they in-                                                        
30 The California Public Employees Retirement System’s current value as of July 31, 
2017, is $345.26 billion dollars. CalPERS Investment Fund Values, CALPERS, https:// 
www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/asset-classes/asset-allocation-performance/in-
vestment-fund-values (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).  
31 Liz Farmer, Pension Fund Takes Unprecedented Climate Change Action, GOVERNING (Mar. 
17, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-climate-change-pension-
calpers.html. 
32  Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, SEC (2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/ le-
gal/cfslb14.htm. 
33 Ronald O. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 
Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developments-du-
ring-the-2017-proxy-season. 
34  See SRI Basics, US SIF: THE F. FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., 
http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
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vest conduct their business in a socially 
and environmentally responsible manner.... 
Generally, we take as our frame of refer-
ence policies that have been developed by 
groups such as the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility, the General 
Board of Pension and Health Benefits of 
the United Methodist Church, Domini So-
cial Investments, and other leading church 
shareholders and socially responsible mu-
tual fund companies. Additionally, we in-
corporate the active ownership and in-
vestment philosophies of leading globally 
recognized initiatives such as the United 
Nations Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative (UNEP FI), the United Nations 
Principles for Responsible Investment 
(UNPRI), the United Nations Global 
Compact, and environmental and social 
European Union Directives.35  
Board members and company executives must therefore consider 
these factors due to the influence that ISS, other proxy advisory firms, 
and socially responsible investors such as pension funds have on the in-
vesting public.36 Although the Trump Administration’s stated priorities 
regarding certain social issues may lead a board to consider cutting back 
on funding CSR or sustainability initiatives, that short-term thinking may 
have long term consequences for the bottom line and investor relations.  
                                                         
35 United States SRI Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2017 Policy Recommendations, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERV. 8 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy 
/2017-sri-us-voting-guidelines.pdf. 
36 See Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regres-
sion-Discontinuity Design, Forbes Vol. 29, No. 12, (Dec. 2016), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/christopherskroupa/2017/06/26/proxy-advisors-their-rise-their-value/#30f26ecf 
6e10. 
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II.  LAWYERS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICERS AS GATEKEEPERS 
Lawyers and compliance officers must ensure corporate compli-
ance with Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, the New York Stock Exchange 
Listing Rules, and the directives discussed in Part I, but they should also 
play a pivotal role in developing, implementing, and sustaining an ERM 
program tailored to both their industry and company.  
Prudent firms conduct ERM assessments, and rating agencies 
and investors expect them to do so because they view ERM “as a leading 
indicator of a firm's ability to operate within a controlled risk/reward 
framework.” 37  ERM extends to strategic, operations, reporting, and 
compliance risks as outlined by the Committee of Sponsoring Organiza-
tions (“COSO”), the standard-bearer for ERM.38 COSO defines ERM as 
a “process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and 
other personnel, applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and man-
age risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.”39  
COSO encourages boards to focus on: (1) what the firm is will-
ing to accept as it pursues shareholder value; (2) a knowledge of man-
agement’s risk management processes that have identified and assessed 
the most significant enterprise-wide risks; (3) a review of the risk portfo-
lio compared to the risk appetite; and (4) whether management is proper-
ly responding to the most significant risks and apprising the board of                                                         
37 Mark Murray, Rating Agencies Are Positive on ERM: Why Insurers Need to Pay Attention, 
WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Sept. 2013), https://www.towerswatson.com/enUS 
/Insights/Newsletters/Global/emphasis/2013/rating-agencies-are-positive-on-erm 
(explaining ERM’s increasing influence on ratings and regulations and determining that 
the methodologies employed by rating agencies and the reporting requirements set by 
regulators have become more prospective in nature). 
38 See COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION 
(COSO), THOUGHT LEADERSHIP IN ERM DEMYSTIFYING SUSTAINABILITY RISK 3 
(MAY 2013) [hereinafter COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT]; See also COSO EX-
ECUTIVE SUMMARY, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT - INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, 3 
(2004) [hereinafter COSO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]  
39 COSO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 38, at 2.  
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those risks.40 Firms must also carefully consider the external environ-
ment, since the achievement of the strategic and operations objective is 
often due to events outside of the entity’s control.41 The political land-
scape under President Trump serves as but one example. Further, audi-
tors and accounting firms must now advise companies to quantify non-
financial risks and to prioritize them based on materiality as it relates to 
the company’s operational and financial performance.42  
Rating agencies pay attention to firms’ ERM efforts as well. 
Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”) considers: how the organization has estab-
lished risk tolerances and how these tolerances are applied to the overall 
strategic decision-making process; risk-control processes for each firm; 
and how the firm manages emerging risks.43 S&P also analyzes earning 
loss, enterprise value, and other financial metrics for various risks.44  
ERM in the past was relegated to financial and audit personnel, 
but lawyers now play an increasingly important role as gatekeepers—a 
role academics have talked about for years.45 Among other things, the 
lawyer/gatekeeper protects the public and the shareholders from malfea-
sance or excessive risk taking by management and the board.  
                                                        
40 Id., at 1. 
41 Id., at 3; COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 38, at 4. 
42See Marcy Murninghan, Redefining Materiality II:  Why It Matters, Who’s Involved, 
and What It Means for Corporate Leaders and Boards 4, (Ted Grant ed., 2013). 
43 See generally SRIDHAR MANYEM, S&P’S ERM FRAMEWORK (2015), http://www.ulti-
risk.com/pdf/ultimate-risk-may-2015-sridahr-presentation.pdf. 
44 Id. at 16. 
45 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 192 (Oxford 2008) (focusing on the role of corporate counsel 
on reviewing due diligence and corporate transactions); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney 
As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (2003) 
(“[G]atekeepers are independent professionals who are so positioned that, if they with-
hold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some 
transaction or to maintain some desired status.”); Peter J. Henning, The New Corporate 
Gatekeeper, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 29–30 (2016). 
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This risk-mitigation role has never been more important because 
of the myriad of compliance and CSR issues facing corporations and the 
potential for deregulation, as promised by President Trump. Thus, it may 
be a good thing that by 2020, 31% of New York Stock Exchange-traded 
companies expect to add a chief risk officer role to their general coun-
sel’s responsibilities and 25% will add a Chief Government Relations Of-
ficer.46 These responsibilities will add to the corporate secretary and chief 
compliance officer titles that many general counsels already hold but will 
ultimately serve both shareholders and stakeholders of companies that 
may engage in more risk in an era of volatility and deregulation.47  
The pioneer of the in-house counsel revolution, Ben Heineman, 
Jr., explains the modern-day inside lawyer’s role this way: 
Without question, the most basic job of the 
General Counsel is to determine what is the law 
and to help shape messages, systems, and process-
es so that the corporation adheres to law and 
avoids legal hazard all across the globe . . . . 
Compliance avoids harm to the corporation, but 
it also creates value inside the corporation, in the 
marketplace, and in broader society by underscor-
ing the corporation’s commitment to integrity and 
differentiating it from less scrupulous rivals.48 
It is not surprising then, that when 1,100 chief legal officers were sur-
veyed about what issues “keep [them] up at night” in the two months 
prior to the 2016 election, 74% cited ethics and compliance and 71% 
cited regulatory or governmental changes.49 Twenty-eight percent of re-                                                        
46 General Counsel Pay Trends 2016, EQUILAR 7 (Nov. 2016), http://www.barkergilmore 
.com/hubfs/Docs/Equilar_GC_Pay_Trends_2016_Report.pdf?t=1480526974922. 
47 Id. 
48  BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE 
PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 131 (2016) (emphasis in original). 
49 ACC Chief Legal Officers 2017 Survey, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS. 1, 4 (2017), 
https://www.acc.com/vl/public/Surveys/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&page
id=1449472&page=/legalresources/resource.cfm&qstring=show=1449472&fromLibra
ry=1&title=ACC%20Chief%20Legal%20Officers%202017%20Survey%20%20Executi 
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spondents have been targeted by a regulator in the past two years. 50 
Board members in a September 2016 survey also expressed concern 
about regulatory changes and scrutiny as a top risk.51 These pre-election 
survey results make sense because at the time the surveys were answered, 
most people expected a democrat to win, and that could have theoreti-
cally led to more stringent regulations on business. 
This regulatory uncertainty should, diminish under a Republican 
Congress and Republican President, particularly a President with an 
avowed pro-business, deregulatory agenda. However, other than a com-
plex and controversial tax plan that strongly favors some business types 
over others, no other major substantive legislation has passed in the first 
twelve months of the Administration.52  
Moreover, President Trump’s unexpected and often controver-
sial executive orders have actually increased regulatory uncertainty. In 
fact, in a study of 10-Ks and 20-Fs filed between September 1, 2016 and                                                                                                                                   
ve%20Summary&recorded=1. The Association of Corporate Counsel Chief Legal Of-
ficers 2017 Survey is the largest global study of the issues and challenges facing chief 
legal officers in corporate legal departments. 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 See N.C. State Poole College of Management, Executive Perspectives on Top Risks for 
2017: Key Issues Being Discussed in the Boardroom and C-Suite, PROTIVITI 7, 
https://www.protiviti.com/sites/default/files/united_states/insights/nc-state-protiviti-
survey-2017-top-risks.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). North Carolina State University’s 
ERM Initiative and Protiviti surveyed 735 C-level executives, 55 percent of whom are 
based in the United States. Id. at 2. 
52 The tax cuts went into effect on January 1, 2018 for businesses but as of the time of 
this writing, it was too early to tell the effects of the cuts. Several commentators have 
questioned whether the plan favors larger businesses over smaller business. See e.g., Joe 
Ciolli, An Econ Professor Turned Small-Business Owner Breaks Down his 3 Big Problems with the 
GOP Tax Plan, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2017, 6:03 AM) http://www.businessinsid-
er.com/small-business-effect-of-trump-gop-tax-bill-2017-12; Brittany De Lea, What 
Tax Reform Really Means for Small Businesses, FOX BUS. (Dec. 28, 2017), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/12/28/what-tax-reform-really-means-
for-small-businesses.html; Andrew Soergel, GOP Tax Bill Rewards Real Estate, Oil Wile 
Hurting Hospitals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 1, 2018, (12:01 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2018-01-01/gop-tax-bill-rewards-
real-estate-oil-while-hurting-hospitals. 
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April 30, 2017, approximately 600 companies disclosed Brexit-related 
risk and almost as many—approximately 550—disclosed risk factors re-
lating to the Trump administration.53 These risk factors related to the 
very issues that he campaigned on—tax reform, health care, trade, immi-
gration, and environmental concerns. 
III.  KEY CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND GOVERNANCE CONCERNS 
 In this Part, I will address key compliance risks that companies 
face now, particularly under the Department of Labor (“DOL”), the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”), and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”).54 I have chosen these three agencies as examples because 
they have jurisdiction over all public companies and, in some instances, 
over those in their supply chains. For each agency, I will highlight a few 
areas of interest to illustrate the potential risk areas that stem from un-
certainty. From a practical perspective, companies must determine 
whether to increase or decrease compliance spending in light of the stat-
ed priorities. Decreasing compliance budgets and pulling back on policies 
may lead to more risk in the long term, even if such actions comply with 
the letter of the law under President Trump.  
 The DOL, which implements dozens of labor laws affecting ap-
plicants, workers, federal contractors, and retirees, has often been at 
odds with the business community. Labor Secretary Acosta has only 
provided some measure of relief for corporate America. In one “victory” 
for employers, the DOL has pulled back on Obama-era changes to the 
overtime rules, stating in a request for public comments that "[t]he De-
partment is aware of stakeholder concerns that the standard salary level                                                         
53 Michal Berkner et al., SEC Disclosure Trends Related to Brexit and the Trump Administra-
tion, SKADDEN (May 25, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications 
/2017/05/sec-disclosure-trends-related-to-brexit. 
54 Although over 65% of chief legal officers raised data breaches and information secu-
rity as top concerns, those topics are large and important enough to merit a separate 
article, and thus I will not discuss them here even though they are or will likely be on 
every board agenda in the country.  See ACC Chief Legal Officers 2017 Survey, supra note 
49, at 4. Board members listed those as top 10 concerns, as well. See Executive Perspectives 
on Top Risks for 2017: Key Issues Being Discussed in the Boardroom & C-Suite, supra note 51, at 
7. 
2017]                     CORPORATIONS IN THE TRUMP/PENCE ERA                     291 
set in the 2016 Final Rule was too high. In particular, stakeholders have 
expressed the concern that the new salary level inappropriately excludes 
from exemption too many workers . . . .”55  
Secretary Acosta at first did not satisfy business leaders or Presi-
dent Trump by delaying the implementation of the so-called fiduciary 
rule, which raises the fiduciary standard of brokers to be the same as the 
standard of Registered Investment Advisors.56 Many business leaders had 
complained that the Obama-era rule was overbroad, capricious, paternal-
istic, and unnecessary, and, in June 2016, five lawsuits were filed against 
the DOL.57  Providing some measure of hope to the business communi-
ty, in February 2017, President Trump signed an executive order requir-
ing a review of the rule explaining:  
One of the priorities of my Administra-
tion is to empower Americans to make 
their own financial decisions, to facilitate 
their ability to save for retirement and 
build the individual wealth necessary to 
afford typical lifetime expenses, such as 
buying a home and paying for college,                                                         
55 See Request for Information; Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, 
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 82 Fed. Reg. 
34616 (proposed July 26, 2017) (pending comments), https://www.federalregister.gov 
/documents/2017/07/26/2017-15666/request-for-information-defining-and-
delimiting-the-exemptions-for-executive-administrative. 
56 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule–Retirement Invest-
ment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 
2016-01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between In-
vestment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (Prohibited Trans-
action Exemption 2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-
1, 84-24 & 86-128, 82 Fed. Reg. 16902 (proposed Apr. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 2510), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/07/2017-
06914/ definition-of-the-term-fiduciary-conflict-of-interest-rule-retirement-investment-
advice-best; see also John Hilton, Trump’s DOL Backs Fiduciary Rule in Legal Brief, INSUR-
ANCENNEWSNET.COM (July 5, 2017), https://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/ 
trumps-dol-backs-fiduciary-rule-legal-brief#.WeUYWxNSzFQ. 
57 See Jacklyn Wille, Labor Department Faces Five Lawsuits Over Fiduciary Rule, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (June 10, 2016), https://www.bna.com/labor-department-faces-n57982073912/. 
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and to withstand unexpected financial 
emergencies. . . . [The Fiduciary Rule] 
may significantly alter the manner in 
which Americans can receive financial 
advice, and may not be consistent with 
the policies of my Administration.58  
However, surprising many observers, just a few months later, 
Secretary Acosta filed a brief responding to the litigation. He explained: 
[The] DOL reasonably determined, on 
the basis of the extensive record before it, 
that conflicted transactions involving cer-
tain annuities should be required to satisfy 
the BIC Exemption . . . . DOL concluded 
that the exemption’s conditions are nec-
essary to protect retirement investors 
from the harms posed by conflicted 
transactions involving these complicated 
products.59  
At the end of November, Secretary Acosta reversed position on the de-
lay of implementation and now enforcement will not occur until the 
middle of 2019, leading some to believe that the rule may never go into 
effect.60 This means that while the review is pending, firms must deter-
mine whether to develop systems and structures to comply with the rule.   
The Trump Administration further confounded the business 
community during oral argument in a Supreme Court case, heard in early 
October 2017, which could have a significant impact on an estimated                                                         
58 Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Feb. 3, 2017) 
(available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-
memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule). 
59 See Hilton, supra note 56. 
60 Mark Schoeff Jr., Delay of DOL Fiduciary Rule Enforcement Mechanisms Now Final, In-
vestment News (Nov. 27, 2017, 2:04 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article 
/20171127/FREE/171129942/delay-of-dol-fiduciary-rule-enforcement-mechanisms-
now-final.  
2017]                     CORPORATIONS IN THE TRUMP/PENCE ERA                     293 
55% of employers and 25 million employees.61 The Court will opine on 
the controversial use of class action waivers and mandatory arbitration in 
the employment context. Specifically, the Court will decide whether 
mandatory arbitration violates the National Labor Relations Act 62  
(“NLRB”) or is permissible under the Federal Arbitration Act. 63  The 
Trump administration reversed position and supported the employers 
instead of the employees as the Obama Administration had done when 
the cases were first filed. The current administration also argued in Court 
against its own NLRB position that these agreements are invalid.64 Alt-
hough many business leaders were pleased with the change in position 
that would allow mandatory arbitration of employment disputes, that 
position is not consistent within the Trump Administration, as evidenced 
by the Supreme Court oral argument. Accordingly, until the President 
fills the slate of labor commissioners, companies cannot be sure of how 
the NLRB will rule on key policies and cases.  
Congress has also slashed the 2018 budget for both the DOL 
and NLRB,65 and therefore key Obama-era proposals may never be final-                                                        
61 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
809 (Jan. 13, 2017); Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 
(5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017). 
62 See Frequently Asked Questions, N.L.R.B., https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/ faq/nlrb 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
63 See Asa Lopatin, What Constitutes Arbitration for Federal Arbitration Act Purposes?, A.B.A. 
(June 16, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles 
/spring2014-0614-federal-arbitration-act.html. 
64 For more information and to read the filed briefs, see National Labor Relations Board v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cas-
es/national-labor-relations-board-v-murphy-oil-usa-inc/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
65  U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FY 2018 BUDGET IN BRIEF (2017), available at 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/FY2018BIB_0.pdf; Bourree Lam, The Jobs 
Programs Trump’s Budget Would Cut, ATLANTIC (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/business/archive/2017/03/trump-budget-dol/519933/; Celine McNicholas & 
Samantha Sanders, Policy Watch: Cuts to DOL Budget, Attacks on Joint Employer Standard, 
ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECONS. BLOG (July 14, 2017), http://www.epi.org/ 
blog/policy-watch-cuts-to-dol-budget-attacks-on-joint-employer-standard/. 
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ized and enforcement efforts will likely decrease due to lack of resources. 
The potential under-enforcement may thus lead to higher risk taking in 
labor and employment matters, and particularly in health and safety. 
The DOJ under Jeff Sessions has also added uncertainty for cor-
porate America, particularly as it relates to corporate investigations and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing. Former Deputy Attorney General 
Yates under President Obama had announced in September 2015 that if 
companies wanted leniency credit during an investigation, they would 
have to engage in an unprecedented level of cooperation, including 
providing names and investigation reports about corporate insiders who 
had committed wrongdoing. 66  The six elements outlined in what is 
known as the “Yates Memo” are as follows: 1) cooperation credit is only 
available if companies provide “all relevant facts”; 2) “criminal and civil 
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from inception”; 3) 
criminal and civil DOJ attorneys should communicate often and refer 
cases; 4) there is no protection for individuals from liability in corporate 
resolutions absent “extraordinary circumstances”; 5) the DOJ must have 
a clear plan to resolve individual cases before statute of limitations runs 
and declinations require approval; and 6) the government should not fo-
cus on an individual’s ability to pay when looking at civil cases.67  
As many critics (including me) have pointed out, this policy inev-
itably leads to potential erosion of the attorney-client privilege and to 
company executives seeking their own counsel, thus slowing down inves-
tigations.68 Although companies did not generally agree with this policy 
statement, they have adapted to the new normal over the past two years. 
Current Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced in Sep-
tember 2017 that the DOJ would likely change the parameters of the 
                                                        
66 Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Att’y Gen. Memo, 2 (Sept. 9, 
2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/ download.  
67 Id. at 2–3. 
68 See e.g., Nathan Huff, One Year Later: Yates Memo Remains a Threat to the Privileged Status 
of Internal Investigations, A.B.A. WHITE COLLAR CRIME COMMITTEE NEWSL., Win-
ter/Spring 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/crim-
inaljustice/2017/wcccn2017_huff.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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Yates Memo.69 Because there were no specifics regarding whether the 
DOJ would abrogate or merely tweak the policy, corporate counsel and 
compliance officers are now stuck in limbo. 
Voluntary disclosures and corporate leniency programs figure 
prominently in the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”) as well. Both the DOJ and SEC share enforcement power, 
and firms should assume that both agencies will continue vigorous en-
forcement. Attorney General Sessions made clear that: 
[C]orruption harms free competition, dis-
torts prices, and often leads to substand-
ard products and services coming into 
this country. It also increases the cost of 
doing business, and hurts honest compa-
nies that don’t pay these bribes.  
[The DOJ] wants to create an even play-
ing field for law-abiding companies. [The 
DOJ] will continue to strongly enforce 
the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.  
. . . . 
The Department of Justice will continue 
to emphasize the importance of holding 
individuals accountable for corporate 
misconduct. It is not merely companies, 
but specific individuals, who break the 
law.70  
                                                        
69 Sarah N. Lynch, Justice Department Mulls Changing Corporate Prosecution Policy, REUTERS 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-whitecollar/justice-
department-mulls-changing-corporate-prosecution-policy-idUSKCN1BP2KD. 
70 See Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance Initiative An-
nual Conference (Apr. 24, 2017) (transcript available at Department of Justice 
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-
remarks-ethics-and-compliance-initiative-annual). 
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 In keeping with Sessions’ comments, in early 2017, DOJ an-
nounced the extension of an Obama-era pilot program under which 
companies that voluntarily self-report violations, cooperate with the gov-
ernment, and remediate a violation may receive reduced penalties, includ-
ing a declination of prosecution and disgorgement.71 In November 2017, 
the DOJ announced a new, revised FCPA policy.72 Notably, Deputy AG 
Rosenstein introduced the policy by announcing, 
The new policy enables the Department 
to efficiently identify and punish criminal 
conduct, and it provides guidance and 
greater certainty for companies struggling 
with the question of whether to make 
voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing 
. . . . Establishing internal policies helps 
guide our exercise of discretion and com-
bat the perception that prosecutors act in 
an arbitrary manner. The new policy does 
not provide a guarantee.  We cannot elim-
inate all uncertainty.  Preserving a meas-
ure of prosecutorial discretion is central 
to ensuring the exercise of justice.73  
Critics have pointed out that this new, nonbinding policy fails to provide 
a true compliance defense and provides guidance without clear reassur-                                                        
71 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Fraud Sect., The Fraud Section's Foreign Corrupt 
Practices. Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download); Acting Att’y Gen. 
Kenneth A. Blanco, Remarks at the A.B.A National Institute on White Collar Crime 
(Mar. 10, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/ opa/speech/acting-
assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-blanco-speaks-american-bar-association-national). 
72 United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-47.120 (2017), available at https://www.justice. 
gov/usam/usam-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977.  
73 Deputy General Rod J. Rosenstein, Remarks at the 34th International Conference on 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) (transcript available at https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-in-
ternational-conference-foreign).  
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ance because of the discretion allowed to prosecutors.74 Significantly, this 
policy does not protect individuals and thus executives, officers, and 
board members could all face liability without the leniency offered to the 
company that may turn their names over to the government as culpable 
individuals.  
SEC Chair Jay Clayton has indicated his support for rigorous en-
forcement of the FCPA as well, stating during his confirmation hearing 
that he plans to work “with [his] fellow Commissioners, Enforcement 
Division staff, and other authorities in the U.S. and abroad to coordinate 
enforcement of the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.”75 Companies 
should therefore stay the course related to FCPA training, policy devel-
opment, and compliance initiatives particularly because other SEC staff 
have reaffirmed the agency’s commitment to enforcement.76 
Public companies must not only consider the enforcement priori-
ties of the DOL, NLRB, and DOJ, but they must also consider the SEC. 
The year 2016 was a record year for the SEC with 868 enforcement ac-
tions of financial reporting misconduct, 160 cases against investment ad-
visers or investment companies, and 21 FCPA enforcement actions.77 
Significantly, the SEC also touted its enforcement against gatekeepers, 
including attorneys.78  
                                                        
74 Statement on the DOJ’s New “Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy”, FCPA PROFES-
SOR (Nov. 29, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/statement-dojs-new-revised-fcpa-cor-
porate-enforcement-policy/#more-23708. 
75 See Questions for the Nomination of Mr. Jay Clayton to be a Member of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, from Ranking Member Sherrod Brown, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & 
Urban Affairs 115th Cong. 9 (2017), available at http://src.bna.com/nBm. 
76 Steven R. Peikin, Co-Director, Enforcement Division, Reflections on the Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of the SEC’s Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
Speech at New York University School of Law (Nov. 9, 2017) (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin-2017-11-09).  
77 Press Release, S.E.C., SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2016 1 (Oct. 11, 
2016) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html). 
78 Id. at 3. 
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While former SEC Chair Mary Jo White used a “broken windows 
approach,” enforcing minor violations to promote less risk taking and 
more compliance,79 the SEC under Chair Clayton will likely employ a 
different strategy. In a July 2017 speech laying out his priorities, he made 
it clear that he would focus on “Main Street investors” and stemming the 
50% decline in listed companies by requiring more reasonable, material 
disclosures.80 Among other things, the agency will now focus on: en-
forcement actions related to cybersecurity; improving disclosure for in-
vestors, including through the now partially-enacted Fiduciary Rule de-
scribed above; and “root[ing] out fraud and shady practices in the mar-
kets, particularly in areas where Main Street investors are most ex-
posed.”81  
In this section, I have discussed only a fraction of compliance, 
governance, and CSR issues that counsel, management, and boards must 
consider in the Trump era. Some firms, regardless of size or whether 
they are publicly traded, must keep track of hundreds of regulations 
promulgated by dozens of agencies at home and abroad. Companies in 
their supply chains must also focus on this ever-changing regulatory 
landscape, particularly in the age of disclosure. Although there is likely to 
be less regulation, and, in some cases, deregulation in the Trump era,82                                                         
79Mary Jo White, SEC Chair, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 
2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/spch100913mjw); Ed 
Beeson, SEC Enforcement Chief Says ‘Broken Windows’ is Working, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/715013/sec-enforcement-chief-says-brokenwindows 
-is-working. 
80 Jay Clayton, S.E.C. Chairman, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (July 12, 
2017) (transcript available at SEC at https://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/remarks-
economic-club-new-york). 
81 Id. 
82 President Trump touted his record of rolling back regulations in a December 14, 
2017 speech. Justin Sink & Alan Levin, Trump Boasts of Bringing a “Screeching” Halt to 
Growth Regulations, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 14, 2017, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-14/trump-boasts-of-screeching-
halt-to-growth-of-u-s-regulations. His Administration released a regulatory plan as well. 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified 
Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, REGINFO, https://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/do/eAgendaMain (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). Some of the rollbacks that the Ad- 
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that does not necessarily make counsel’s job easier when shareholders 
and stakeholders, including employees and customers, play such an im-
portant role in corporate success. 
IV.  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE IN THE 
TRUMP ERA? 
Public perception of companies matters. According to a recent 
study, 63% of Americans want businesses that will take the lead to drive 
social and environmental change moving forward, in the absence of gov-
ernment regulation; 78% want companies to address social justice issues; 
87% will be more likely to purchase a product because a company advo-
cated for an issue they cared about; and 76% state that they will “refuse 
to purchase a company’s products or services upon learning it supported 
an issue contrary to [their] beliefs.”83 Perhaps responding to this socially 
conscious customer, CEOs have publicly criticized the President’s poli-
cies and actions, even if they don’t name the President himself. They 
have issued statements, either as individuals or for their companies, on 
wide ranging topics such as the travel ban, climate change, transgender 
rights, diversity, immigration, racial violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
and gun control.84 
Notwithstanding public support for socially responsible compa-
nies, firms with strong CSR commitments may perceive a conflict be-
tween shareholder wealth maximization and stakeholder norms. For ex-                                                                                                                                  
ministration takes credit for had already died under President Obama. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/ 2017-12-11/trump-takes-credit-for-
killing-hundreds-of-regulations-that-were-already-dead 
83 2017 Cone Communications CSR Study, CONE COMMUNICATIONS, http://www. 
conecomm.com/2017-cone-communications-csr-study-pdf (last visited Nov. 25 2017).  
I have argued that people do not always practice what they preach when it comes to 
actually purchasing products or boycotting companies. Marcia Narine Weldon, Disclosing 
Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84, 136–38 (2015).  However, these statistics about consumer pref-
erences are still important as companies try to build and maintain their brands. 
84 Leslie Gaines-Ross, What CEO Activism Looks Like in the Trump Era, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/what-ceo-activism-looks-like-in-the-trump-
era. 
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ample, the Trump Administration has announced a rollback of a number 
of Obama-era environmental rules and has disbanded a number of scien-
tific advisory committees.85 In June 2017, the President pulled out of the 
Paris Climate Accord (the “Accord”), an agreement that almost 200 na-
tions had pledged to support.86 As the President explained,  
[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the 
latest example of Washington entering 
into an agreement that disadvantages the 
United States to the exclusive benefit of 
other countries, leaving American work-
ers -- who I love -- and taxpayers to ab-
sorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower 
wages, shuttered factories, and vastly di-
minished economic production.87  
In what some consider one of the biggest rollbacks, on October 
10, 2017, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) proposed a 
repeal of the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), the centerpiece of President 
Obama’s climate change plan stating, “[r]epealing [CPP] will also facili-
tate the development of U.S. energy resources and reduce unnecessary 
                                                        
85 Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How Trump Is Changing the Environment, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 25, 2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 2017/03/how-
trump-is-changing-science-environment/. See generally Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, 
E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/10/09/climate/clean-power-plan.html. 
86 Press Release, President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris 
Climate Accord (June 1, 2017) (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-
office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord); Mike James, 195 
Countries Signed Paris Climate Agreement, 2 Oppose it. For Now. (May 31, 2017, 6:28 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/05/31/only-two-nations-out-
197-oppose-climate-pact---and-us-may-next/102360164/; United Nations Climate 
Change, Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement 
/items/9444.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).  
87 Id. 
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regulatory burdens associated with the development of those resources . . 
. .”88 
The Trump Administration’s complete reversal from the Obama 
Administration’s policies on climate change and the environment89 poses 
a dilemma for companies that have already publicly committed to mini-
mizing their environmental impacts. Prior to the President’s withdrawal 
from the Accord, some of the nation’s largest companies publicly urged 
him to remain in the Accord.90 Hundreds of CEOs and dozens of state 
and local governments pledged to voluntarily comply with the Accord’s 
standards, notwithstanding the President’s actions.91 Seventy-one percent 
of Fortune 100 and forty-three percent of the Fortune 500 companies 
have already publicly indicated an intent to increase spending on renewa-
ble energy and sustainability initiatives.92 In 2015, more than 5,600 com-
panies—close to 60% of the market capitalization of the world’s largest 
stock exchanges—disclosed environmental data through the Carbon                                                         
88 Press Release, EPA, EPA Takes Another Step To Advance President Trump's Amer-
ica First Strategy, Proposes Repeal Of "Clean Power Plan" (Oct. 10, 2017) (available at 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-
america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal). 
89 Jennifer Hansler, 5 Major Changes to US Environmental Policy in 2017, CNN POLITICS 
(Dec. 30, 2017, 8:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/30/ politics/environmental-
policy-moments-2017/index.html; Michael Grenshko, Laura Parker & Brian Clark 
Howard, A Running List of How Trump is Changing the Environment, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-
science-environment/.  
90 Businesses Urge President to Remain in Paris Agreement, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/international/business-support-paris-agreement 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
91 Seth Feigermen, Apple, Facebook, Google Join Hundreds of Businesses in Support for Paris 
Agreement, CNN TECH (June 5, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/05/technology 
/business/businesses-paris-climate-agreement/index.html; Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry 
Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States & Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-
climate-standards.html. 
92  2016 Corporate Advanced Energy Commitments, ADVANCED ENERGY ECON. (Dec. 
2016), https://info.aee.net/hubfs/PDF/F100_F500.pdf?t=1508158577960. 
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Disclosure Project (“CDP”), a UK-based nonprofit.93 Twenty percent of 
the world’s emissions of greenhouse gases are accounted for through the 
CDP portal, and 827 investors representing $100 trillion USD access 
company climate change data through CDP.94 “In 2016, 533 cities, [over] 
100[] state governments, and thousands of companies voluntarily report-
ed their climate impacts through the CDP platform.”95 
Investors have also demanded action. Companies faced 144 envi-
ronmental proposals in 2017, and 69 related to climate change.96 Alt-
hough most did not pass, one notable exception was ExxonMobil. 
Shareholders of ExxonMobil—a company under investigation by a 
number of state regulators for misleading the public on climate 
change 97 —have demanded an accounting of climate change risks. 98  
Blackrock and Vanguard, two of the company’s largest investors, led the 
charge for disclosure.99 
How then should companies react in light of the Trump agenda 
and his appointment of Scott Pruitt, who has sued the EPA over a dozen 
times and who has, along with President Trump, questioned the scien-
tific consensus on climate change?100 Should boards now reconsider how                                                         
93 About Us, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).  
94 Disclosing as a Company, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/companies-discloser (last vis-
ited Nov. 25, 2017).  
95 Amberli Young, Transparency is a Key Ingredient for City Climate Action, INST. FOR MKT. 
TRANSFORMATION (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.imt.org/news/the-current /transpar-
ency-is-a-key-ingredient-to-city-climate-action.   
96 Mueller & Ising, supra note 33. 
97 Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil's Climate Change Communica-
tions (1977–2014), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 12 (Aug. 23, 2017), http://iop-
science.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f.  
98  Diane Cardwell, ExxonMobil Shareholders Demand Accounting of Climate Change Policy 
Risks, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/business 
/energy-environment/exxon-shareholders-climate-change.html. 
99 Id. 
100 Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-
global-warming.html; Dominique Mosbergen, Scott Pruitt Has Sued the Environmental Pro- 
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to allocate shareholder resources away from climate change and envi-
ronmental initiatives by perhaps investing in new products, increasing 
dividends, or buying back shares?  
I argue that boards of socially responsible companies should not 
reverse course under the Trump Administration. Instead, boards and 
executives should serve both shareholder and stakeholder interests by 
staying the course even when legislative changes related to the environ-
ment, social issues, and corporate governance may allow firms to relax 
standards or eliminate programs. At a minimum, firms impacted by cli-
mate change regulation should disclose the potential impact of these pol-
icies and potential regulator changes to their shareholders. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Part II, I laid out the COSO ERM framework, and I will close 
this Essay with ERM questions and concerns that compliance officers, 
boards, management, and shareholders should consider when managing 
and mitigating risk in the Trump/Pence era. 
1) What is the firm willing to accept as it pursues share-
holder value? To answer this question, firms must answer 
(and possibly reconsider): a) what is shareholder value, b) 
who are the shareholders, and c) what do they want? In many 
companies, institutional investors now own most of the 
shares. They drive the shareholder proposals, and they have 
the ear of the company’s investor relations department and 
executive management. The “Main Street investor” that SEC 
Chair Clayton wants to protect mainly invests through mutu-
al funds (an institutional investor). These institutional inves-
tors now expect more, not less information about ESG fac-
tors and how they affect the business and the larger commu-
nity. The ExxonMobil vote on climate change was initiated 
by powerhouse investors Blackrock and Vanguard, not an 
environmental non-governmental organization. Taking ad-                                                                                                                                  
tection Agency 13 Times. Now He Wants to Lead It, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/scott-pruitt-environmental-protection-
agency_us_5878ad15e4b0b3c7a7b0c29c.  
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vantage of the new regulatory landscape by reducing expendi-
tures on ESG initiatives and compliance programs may only 
provide “value” to short-term investors. Further, it will in-
crease the risk-taking behavior that led to Sarbanes-Oxley 
and Dodd-Frank. In other words, short term risk taking un-
der a less stringent regulatory regime may in fact lead to an 
increase in regulation during a future administration. 
2) What are management’s risk management processes 
that have identified and assessed the most significant 
enterprise-wide risks? As stated earlier, the coun-
sel/gatekeeper role will and should increase in importance. 
Even those counsel who do not add a “risk officer” title to 
their names must keep Ben Heineman’s words in mind: in-
house counsel are responsible for helping to shape the sys-
tems and processes so that the companies can avoid legal 
hazards. This means that counsel and compliance officers 
must hone new skills that help them proactively assess risk in 
areas of regulatory scrutiny that may increase such as cyber-
security.  
3)  Review the risk portfolio compared to the risk appetite. 
If companies face less regulation or even deregulation, risk 
appetite may go up. If the firm no longer has to worry about 
compliance and audits by certain regulatory agencies, some 
managers and employees may choose to relax or ignore rules, 
or more likely, cut back on funding for training and internal 
monitoring. This will inevitably change the compliance and 
ethics culture. This could, in turn, to lead to more whistle-
blowers or failure to report wrongdoing. Counsel, therefore, 
should work with operations and management to re-evaluate 
the risk profile considering current and pending legislation, as 
well as potential stakeholder reaction. For example, a compa-
ny may suffer higher turnover rates and disengagement from 
employee and stakeholders if it chooses to relax its safety 
program to comply with the bare minimum required by law 
under the Trump Administration. A review of the risk appe-
tite also includes a discussion of whether the company is will-
ing to risk voluntary disclosure of a compliance failure to re-
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ceive cooperation credit from the government, even at the 
expense of criminal charges being levied against executives 
and/or board members.  
4)  Whether management is properly responding to the 
most significant risks and apprising the board of those 
risks. The counsel/gatekeeper must help develop and assess 
the portfolio of risks, understand the risk appetite, recalibrate 
if necessary, and ensure that management and the board is 
aware of the risks, including the risk of regulatory uncertain-
ty, particularly in light of the board’s Caremark obligations. To 
properly apprise the board, counsel must work in a more in-
terdisciplinary way with the IT, human resources, internal 
audit, health and safety, and marketing departments to assess 
risk cross-functionally, rather than working in silos as hap-
pens in so many organizations. 
In sum, counsel must expand beyond merely knowing the law. 
They must graduate from being risk-adverse to being risk intelligent by 
reevaluating their company’s vulnerability, and balancing that vulnerabil-
ity in the context of financial, regulatory, reputational, and legal risk in a 
volatile political climate.101 This risk intelligence must include a discus-
sion with the board and executive management regarding the changing 
demands of the consumer market and the investor community particu-
larly on ESG matters, notwithstanding clear signals from President 
Trump that the Administration will minimize regulatory scrutiny. The 
new environment may also require additional transparency in public fil-
ings and with government regulators as uncertainty increases. Finally, 
counsel and compliance officers as gatekeepers must redouble efforts to 
strengthen ethical culture and ensure that the company’s compensation 
and other incentives structures promote the appropriate level of risk tak-
ing at all levels in the organization. 
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